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We show that the monogamy of entanglement is a sufficient phenomenon in every physical theory,
if the quantum key distribution is to be safe on the grounds of such theory. To do so we present
the QKD protocol that is safe in any physical theory under the assumption of the monogamous
entanglement only. The necessity of this condition is also discussed.
I. INTRODUCTION
The quantum cryptography offers us unprecedented
degree of safety, with the laws of quantum mechanics
serving as a warranty. Recently the issue of what hap-
pens to this safety beyond quantum mechanics has been
raised [1, 2]. Both these papers present protocols that
are safe in the classes of theories that include but are
not confined to quantum mechanics and both have their
disadvantages. In [1] authors base the security of their
protocol on the assumption of no signalling while repeat-
ing after [3] that every deterministic non-local theory al-
lows signalling. This excludes the wide range of the most
promising alternatives to the quantum mechanics, that
is the non-local, hidden variables theories. The proto-
col presented in [2] on the other hand is proven secure
even in the light of de’Broglie-Bohm theory with the ini-
tial particle positions known to Eve. Unfortunately it is
the only non-local, realistic theory for which the proof in
[2] can be validated. The disadvantage shared by both
these protocols is that their implementation would be
very difficult. In this paper we present the entangled-
state cryptographic protocol that is not only secure in
any non-local, hidden variables theory which involves the
monogamy of entanglement but also much easier to im-
plement that those discussed above. The area of this pro-
tocol’s safety includes but is not confined to the classes
of theories covered by the protocols of [1, 2]. In fact it is
shown that this protocol is safe in every physical theory
where safe QKD is at all possible.
II. LIMITATIONS
We start by setting the necessary limitations on com-
municating parties and eavesdropper. Though Eve can
have the knowledge and technology to exploit some yet
unknown post-quantum theory, Alice and Bob are limited
to the use of quantum mechanics at its present form. The
theory used by the eavesdropper must also have three im-
portant traits in order to allow for safe QKD of any kind.
Firstly, Eve can not have any influence on or knowledge
of the choices of the measurements being made at Al-
ice’s and Bob’s labs. Secondly, the theory exploited by
Eve must agree with QM on the outcomes of all the ex-
periments so far conducted. Finally, the entanglement
must be monogamous. The necessity of this condition is
quite obvious. If the entanglement was not monogamous
there would be no way for Alice and Bob to ascertain
whether their systems are entangled with some external
party or not. That party could made the measurements
after the bases are revealed and get any information that
is needed. For the proof of sufficiency we present QKD
protocol which safety is based only on the limitations
mentioned in this section.
Before we start we should clarify what is meant by
the monogamy of entanglement. We will assume that
the monogamy of entanglement is a property of a the-
ory that disallows a third party to find anything about
the outcomes of the measurements done on a maximally
entangled state by measuring some other system (other
ways of finding the outcomes are not forbidden). By
a maximally entangled state we will mean a state for
which two parties can always expect perfect correlations
or anti-correlations even if they can choose between the
measurements in two mutually unbiased bases (as long
as both parties choose the same base).
III. PROTOCOL
Consider the following protocol:
1. Alice and Bobs receive their parts of the system in
a singlet state. They both randomly choose two param-
eters c = 0, pi
2
and φ = 0, pi
8
, pi
4
, 3pi
8
, pi
2
and measure their
parts of the system in basis
|+ 1〉 = cos(φ+ c)|0〉+ sin(φ+ c)|1〉 (1)
| − 1〉 = cos(φ+ c)|1〉 − sin(φ+ c)|0〉 (2)
They repeat this whole step for all the states that they
receive.
2. They randomly choose an appropriate part of the
runs of the protocol. In this cases they both reveal their
bases and measurement outcomes and calculate the ex-
pectation value from the CHSH inequality (basing on the
runs where the choice of their bases was right for this in-
equality). They abort the protocol if it differs from the
predictions of quantum mechanics for the singlet state,
that is 2
√
2. They also abort the protocol if they do not
2observe perfect anti-correlations for the same choice of
the bases and perfect correlations for the choice of bases
differing by pi
2
.
3. They announce their choices of φ (but not c) for
each of the remaining cases.
4. For each of the remaining cases they randomly
choose one of the parties. This party reveals its c and
a random bit XORed with the measurement outcome (of
course binary numbers have to be first assigned to the
outcomes). Second party has now the knowledge of both
bases so he/she knows whether the results are correlated
or anti-correlated and knowing his/her own result can
decode the random bit send.
5. Step 4 is repeated K times, so both parties share a
set of K bits. From this set one bit of key is generated
by XORing all the bits form this set.
IV. PROOF OF SAFETY
If we assume that the standard quantum mechanics is
right then the Step 2 is enough to be sure that Eve has
no knowledge of the state Alice and Bob receive and ipso
facto the key. The protocol is then secure as proved in
[4], where the perfect correlations in two mutually unbi-
ased bases are exploited to prove that the state received
is indeed maximally entangled. Another way to prove
the security on the grounds of quantum mechanics is to
notice that Step 2 uses similar measures to the Ekert’s
original paper [5]. The proof of security for any nonlo-
cal hidden variable model that includes the monogamy
of the entanglement is more difficult. We assume that
the theory known to the eavesdropper is deterministic
since every probabilistic theory can be simulated by an
appropriate deterministic model.
Since we assume the monogamy of the entanglement,
the only way for Eve to know the results of the experi-
ment is to have the access to some hidden initial parame-
ters and know the mechanics (non-local in principle) that
govern the evolution of the state, so she knows what the
results of Alice’s and Bob’s measurements will be for any
choice of the bases. The only thing that she does not
know is what bases were actually chosen, since at each
time only one of them is revealed. This type of attacks
has already been presented in [6] and [7] (actually these
are the only two papers the author is aware of that pro-
pose attacks that are beyond the scope of current physical
theories). The hidden variables in this papers are particle
positions and gravitational fields respectively. Since [7]
deals with the BB84 [8] protocol, the method presented
there does not apply to the safety of the protocol above.
Even if Plaga’s method could be generalized, the QKD
protocol presented here would remain secure against the
type of attacks presented in [7] as well as in [6].
Let us now assign the numbers ±1 to the experiment
outcomes. Eve knows the full structure of the functions
WA(λ, a, b) and WB(λ, a, b) which govern the results at
Alice’s and Bob’s labs. She also knows hidden param-
eter λ in each case, a and b denote the bases of Alice
and Bob respectively. Since perfect (anti-) correlations
are expected in each case (Step 2 guarantees that) these
functions must obey
WA(λ, a, 0)WB(λ, a, 0) = −WA(λ, a, pi
2
)WB(λ, a,
pi
2
) (3)
WA(λ, 0, b)WB(λ, 0, b) = −WA(λ, pi
2
, b)WB(λ,
pi
2
, b) (4)
which is equivalent to
WA(λ, a, 0)WA(λ, a,
pi
2
) = −WB(λ, a, 0)WB(λ, a, pi
2
) (5)
WA(λ, 0, b)WA(λ,
pi
2
, b) = −WB(λ, 0, b)WB(λ, pi
2
, b) (6)
It is clear form (5) that for every λ and a either WA or
WB changes sign as b changes. From (6) we see that the
same is true for a. We can now divide the set of λs into
two separate subsets. For λ ∈ Λ1, WA(λ, a, b) does not
depend on b and WB(λ, a, b) does not depend on a. We
will call this set local. The rest of λs are in the set Λ2
which we will call non-local.
Let us assume that the parties are now during Step 4
of the protocol and Eve’s λ corresponding to this system
is form the set Λ2. Depending on the chosen party the
knowledge of either WA or WB is necessary for the de-
coding of the random bit. At least one of the outcomes
changes with the change of the other party’s base that
is unknown to Eve, which means that in every case Eve
does not know at least one of the outcomes. If it is the
outcome of the chosen party then Eve cannot decode the
random bit. It happens in 50% of the cases. So if λ ∈ Λ2
then Eve has the chance 0.5 of knowing the random bit.
Now it is necessary to estimate the minimal size of the
subset Λ2 compared to the whole set of λs.
To do that let us notice that the theory is required
to give the outcome 2
√
2 in Step 2. If all the λs were
from the local set this value would be 2. If they all were
from the non-local set it could be as high as 4. Now it is
easy to calculate that
√
2 − 1 of λs must be in the non-
local set (throughout the whole paper we assume that
the probability for each λ to occur is the same - we can
do this without any loss of generality).
Now we can conclude that Eve can know the random
bit with the probability p = 3−
√
2
2
≈ 0.79 (She knows the
bit if λ is in the local set and in the half of the cases from
the non-local one). Since Step 4 is repeatedK times then
the bit of key generated in Step 5 is known by Eve with
the probability P = pK . Increasing K leads to arbitrary
small probabilities (for K = 20, P < 1% and increasing
K by 10 reduces P over 10 times).
3V. DISCUSSION
The protocol that has been presented uses only the as-
sumption of monogamous entanglement and thus proves
that it is the sufficient condition for the safety of quan-
tum key distribution.
The necessity and sufficiency of the only assumption
used by the protocol means that the protocol presented
is safe in every physical theory where it is possible to
construct one. Although there is some room for improve-
ment in the fields of speed and efficiency of the protocol
and the safety when it comes to physical implementa-
tions, the safety of this protocol in the terms of physicals
principles that guarantee it is the highest attainable.
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